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Tradition and Identity: ›Aneignung‹ and ›Abgrenzung‹

Introduction

This conference invites us to think about the questions of musical culture, identity and tradition. The literature attached to the conference speaks of an ›Aneignungs- und Abgrenzungsprozess‹, a process which by its very terminology poses certain thematic oppositions: tradition (the continuity of a practice) versus history (the narrative of the changes and crises within a practice), assimilation versus resistance, and identity versus fragmentation. Contemporary awareness of these oppositions in current cultural practice is a partial consequence of the globalisation of music technology, transmission and transfer. Hermeneutic philosophy shares with globalisation an acute awareness of the historical and cultural specificities of cultural practices. If there is any universal acknowledgement in contemporary critical practice it is, clearly, that loyalty to universal norms of composition and performance is no longer tenable. Nietzsche’s prophecy has become a commonplace. All foundations appear to have dissolved. Nevertheless, as a philosopher concerned with aesthetic and hermeneutic experience, I am suspicious of ›large questions‹ and ›big oppositions‹. Nietzsche also once aptly remarked that everything apparently simple is in fact highly complex. After all, reason is, as he and others have noticed, a gross and clumsy tool: it tends to

1 These are the key terms that were set by the organisers of our panel (Musik und kulturelle Identität. Weimar, XIII. Internationaler Kongress der Gesellschaft für Musikforschung. 16. bis 21. September 2004, Programm, Abstracts, Weimar 2004, S. 94). They do not refer here to any specific philosophical work.
simplify, to speak in either/or terms where as the sharper ear of experience hears gradations rather than outright sameness and difference. Like identity and non-identity, modernism and tradition, these are all terms that are interdependent. Far from contradicting or excluding each other, each depends on its correlative term to sustain its meaning. I wish in this presentation to think about these terms a little more closely and want to suggest that in relation to the dynamics of a creative practice, they are far for more interconnected than commonly supposed.

I am not a music theorist but the themes which concern this conference are central motifs in current hermeneutic and aesthetic debate. Hermeneutic philosophy is, of course, primarily concerned with matters of experience, that is, with what a new work says to us and with the preconditions that underwrite the possibility of such speaking. Furthermore, questions relating to tradition, history, and what is referred to as an Aneignungs- und Abgrenzungsprozess are resonant with allusions to Gadamer’s notion of Wirkungsgeschichte. The dynamics of this process have a critical implication for how we understand the identity of a creative practice and it is this implication that I would like to explore. One of the reasons debates about tradition and identity have become so urgent is not so much because of the arguments of deconstruction or postmodernism but because of the empirical fact of globalisation. It is on globalisation and its impact of musical practices that I will make my first remarks.

I. Globalisation: a New Music or ›Musicks‹ Renewed

The modernist tendency in both music and art shares with the globalisation of commerce and communication an aspiration to universality, a universality which frees expression and exchange from the particular limitations of history and geographical location. »Globalisation has done to music what photography did to painting«. Just as photography liberated the painted image from specific geo-cultural locations, so digital recording and communication has freed music performance from the limitations of social and cultural placement. The modernist aspiration towards a progressive universal musical language has been compromised. Europe’s musical sensitivities are now as eclectic as its culinary appetites. The globalisation of musical transmission and transfer has clear advantages. The universalisation of availability has encouraged an increased awareness of the historical specificity.
and cultural differences that distinguish one musical tradition from another. This has (rightly) undermined a once dangerously persuasive ideological prejudice that only the modernist European musical tradition (i.e. the second Viennese school) was progressive and had any merit. Interest in earlier forms of music was condemned as unprogressive, reactionary or conservative precisely because of their identifiable specificity. This unthinking modernist prejudice tried to force all musical forms into a singular universal discourse. This is a prejudice well rid of. It is, after all, a gross arrogance to assume that progression and innovation are possible only within the modernist genre. Thankfully we now listen to Perotinus or Victoria with different and, indeed, enriched ears capable of appreciating both that ingenuity, invention and creativity manifest themselves in all traditions and are not to be sequestered by any one. Globalisation, then, can have an enlightening effect. It can expose the particular prejudices hidden within the universal pretensions of our dominant cultural traditions. However, the globalisation of music transmission has a darker side.

Globalisation may unify a mode of musical transmission but it also fragments, disrupts, and displaces musical traditions. An increased awareness of the real differences between musical traditions, performance conventions and aesthetic form undermines belief in the credibility of any universal norm of practice and evaluation. This can undermine the ‘certainty’ or confidence that sustains creative conviction. As Anthony Giddens observes, the declining authority of a dominant cultural practice engenders a degree of uncertainty that tends to leave the individual practitioner, steering a troubled course between personal commitment and uncertainty.  

All creative practice requires to a certain degree an acceptance of and trust in the norms and expectancies of the tradition within which a composer works. However, philosophically speaking, there is an instructive paradox here. Creativity may require as one of its preconditions a certain stability in the norms of its practice but it equally demands that such norms are to a certain extent questioned, probed and challenged. No creative practice can stay still and remain creative. The vitality of a creative practice resides in it being a process of controlled instability. What globalisation undermines is confidence in the transferability or the universal expansion of the creative values which underwrite a single practice or tradition. Europe has perhaps only fairly recently come to accept that its modernist tradition of creative practice is no longer universally appropriate or privileged. There are two issues here which should not be confused.

First: globalisation may have exposed the ideological (global) pretensions of European modernism but, in doing so, it has also revealed a global truth about creative traditions. Though the advent of globalisation shows that modernism has had its day, it also reveals that all traditions are intrinsically modernist in spirit or have to become so in order to survive. As we have argued, all creative traditions worthy of the name must face the challenge of difference and otherness. Globalisation spells the end of isolationism and cultural protectionism: no practice-tradition can stand on its own anymore, no form of cultural identity is immune from the challenge of the other and the different. However, globalisation has in this respect only made universally apparent what was re-

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ationally speaking almost certainly already the case. Globalisation certainly undermines faith in any universal set of creative norms and as a consequence it demands of practices committed to such a faith that they confront the challenge posed by the emergence of the ›other‹. The challenged practice has to respond in terms of ›Aneignung‹ or ›Abgrenzung‹. Globalisation reveals that the challenge which the ›Aneignungs-Prozess‹ poses individual traditions is neither a regional nor a new challenge but a shared condition characteristic of all vital traditions.

Second: precisely because no creative practice can remain still, no vital practice will remain unfriendly to or uncurious about other traditions. Was it not Nietzsche who observed that no artist will ignore the language of ›good effects‹? To think of a cultural practice as having to absorb, assimilate, and appropriate the other and the different as its own or as having to resist the other to protect its creative integrity is to think of practices as ›subjects‹ or ›agencies‹ rather than as processes. It is to accord them with the status of identities that maintain themselves either by assimilating the other as its own or by wilfully denying the other. However, creative practices are not egos or subjects which define their identity in Sartrean fashion, that is by dominating or negating the other. As we have suggested, a creative practice is always in a state of controlled instability and must remain so in order to maintain the continuity of its narrative. A vital practice will seek out the other precisely to challenge its own suppositions for it is only in risking itself in engagement with the other that a practice can discern a sense of what it might yet be capable of in terms of new expression. In this context philosophical hermeneutics is instructive.

II. On the Question of Practices and their Identity

It is a mistake to think of cultural practices and traditions as fixed, stable identities with an essential core. Traditions are unquestionably continuities of practice but, as MacIntyre points out, the continuities within such practices are invariably continuities of conflict, continuing debates about how the fundamental questions of a practice are best answered. Traditions are better thought of pace? Benjamin and Adorno, as constellar structures, fluid configurations of approach to canonic questions for as Gadamer reminds us traditions are constituted not by works but by the questions which works address. Traditions and/or creative practices are not fixed identities or closed fields of operation. They each address a set of subject-matters or concerns be they to do with expression, form, or rigour. Such subject matters are like grounding concepts. None are fully determinate and so each transcends every historical explication of them. In other words, such subject matters or what Gadamer refers to as ›Sachen‹ are entities about which a great deal has been unsaid and a great deal has yet to be said. A given practice may in the past have approached a certain subject-matter in a determinate way but, in so doing, it opens other as yet untried possibilities of interpretation. This has a consequence for whether a tradition or practice is to be considered as a fixed identity or not.

If we accept that the subject-matters of a tradition are conceptually speaking always of a greater potential conceptual determinacy than any one interpretation permits, then, a practice will always be more than its constituent interpretations will allow. Because of this excess, practices are not identical with their constituent interpretations. Furthermore, the pursuits of any practice will invariably of itself challenge how that practice understands its nature. Practices like traditions maintain themselves by translation and transmission. Yet transmission is inevitably selective or interpretative. The way a practice receives a subject-matter and applies it in its own context, always creates an uneasy and ineliminable difference between what a practice thinks of itself as being and what it can potentially become. It is this ineliminable difference which, as Iser argues, drives a practice towards every new interpretations of itself. The quest for identity generates a non-identity which, in its turn, further stimulates the desire for identity. As we shall now argue, this element of difference or non-identity is precisely the point that makes a practice susceptible to the influence of the strange and the foreign. However, our principal point re-enforces the argument that creative traditions are controlled processes of instability. It also confirms our argument that all creative practices are in a state of crisis for the very interpretative procedures that maintain their being, also disrupt the understanding of constituent subject-matters.

The historical continuity of a practice does not lie in repeatedly performing the same thing but, rather, it unfolds from within its own dialogue with itself, some of its different potentials and possibilities. Each historical period allows a tradition to become more and in becoming more, to become different to itself. Thus, although the parameters of a practice or tradition may be culturally and historically specific, that specificity does not foreclose the creative potentialities within it. How that potentiality unfolds will very much depend upon the external influences brought to bear on the tradition. This explains why vital traditions must, in effect, seek out or risk the other, the strange and the foreign. If traditions are open in the sense that what they might become – their unrealised potential – has not yet been fully determined, all traditions remain in a certain sense unknown to themselves. What a tradition can yet be capable of will only become apparent when it enters into dialogue with other practices. Precisely, because no creative practice can stay still and remain creative, a vibrant practice needs engagement with the other precisely in order to place its norms at risks, to change how it thinks of itself and to discover what it is yet capable of. This process is essentially dialogical. It is not what Nietzsche described as protoplasmic interpretation in which a practice or tradition »makes what it appropriates equal to itself and fits it into its own forms and files«. Such an imperious process risks nothing. It is not essentially creative. The norms of the assimilating practice are not risked or questioned. Neither has ›Aneignung‹ to do with reductive explanations in the way that Adorno discusses them.

Erklären involviert, gewollt oder ungewollt, auch ein Zurückführen des Neuen und Unbekannten auf Bekanntes, wenngleich das Beste an den Werken dagegen sich

sträubt. Ohne solche Reduktion, die an den Kunstenwerken frevelt, könnten sie nicht fortleben. Ihr Wesentliches, das Unerfaßte, ist auf identifizierende Akte, auf Erfassen angewiesen; es wird dadurch zu einem Alten und Bekannten verfälscht.\(^8\)

The process of „Aneignung“ has, arguably, more in common with Gadamer’s notion of „Horizontverschmelzung“. The encounter with the other practice or tradition does not involve a naïve assimilation but an interaction in which the meaning and the norms of each are brought into the open. As a result of the exchange, both parties understand themselves differently. Engagement with the other, enables a practice to risk and test its prejudices. The argument is, then, that precisely because practices are in a certain sense unknown to themselves – i.e. their creative potential is historically speaking never fully determined – they require „engagement“ with the other precisely in order to test and extend their expectancies. What a practice can become thus depends upon the quality of its relations with other practices. What globalisation does is to make engagement with the other inevitable. There are two other features of „Aneignung“ worthy of note.

Firstly, „Aneignung“ is not the opposite of „Abgrenzung“ but entails an element of „Abgrenzung“ within itself. „Aneignung“ implies a process of adaption and application. For two practices to influence one another they must be spatially and temporally contiguous. Furthermore, the two practices must be capable of entering a form of dialogical relationship in that each allows the other to see a shared concern or subject-matter in a new light. Not only must each party be contiguous but what each offers the other must be continuous with its primary concerns, that is, a practice must be able to apply what it gains from the other. These points suggest, secondly, that when a practice achieves a new determination of its creative possibilities in its engagement with an other, it forecloses certain possible determinations of itself. Having achieved a certain adaptation of its possibilities, prevents it from adopting others. Thus a practice will or will not be open or susceptible to certain other influences due to the fatality of its history of interactions. „Abgrenzung“ is necessarily a consequence of „Aneignung“. These remarks bring us to a point where we can begin to reflect upon the problem of the new. Let me preface my remarks as follows.

III. On the Question of the New

If interaction between practices supposes both a contiguity of relation and a continuity of concern, the new emerges not as something in its own right but as a mode of relation between practices. Hermeneutically speaking, the notion of the new seems paradoxical. The phenomenology of the new is of course endearingly powerful in most communities. New births, new beginnings, re-newel, are all celebrated for their evocation of promise, excitement, freshness and movement. The new is always youthful because it is enlivening. Yet, in contrast, to this if perception and knowledge depend upon a background of the already-known,

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for something to recognise as ›new‹ is to admit that on a certain level, it is not new at all. To acknowledge a form or a practice as new is to say that we recognise something already known but in a new or novel guise. The ›new‹ is not known in the sense of being something absolutely original but as a hitherto unexpected variation of an established theme. Adorno observes that »das Verhältnis zum Neuen [...] sein Modell an dem Kind [hat], das auf dem Klavier nach einem noch nie gehört, unberührten Akkord tastet. Aber es gab den Akkord immer schon, die Möglichkeiten der Kombination sind beschränkt, eigentlich steckt schon alles in der Klaviatur.«\(^{10}\) If something is radically new in that its like has not been seen before, there is some doubt that it will be recognised as ›new‹. In other words, what ever emerges as new must already be in part conceptually determinable. This raises to questions to which we will return but it must also prompt questions about the difficulties cultural globalisation supposedly poses.

The globalisation of communication frees music traditions from their geographic and cultural specificity. It has created a virtual contiguity in which no tradition or practice can remain isolated. On one level, this cannot but be a positive development. If all creative practices need ›risk‹ and ›questioning‹ to remain vital and if creative traditions are, in the sense discussed, unknown to themselves, the possibilities of enhanced engagement with the other and the different is to be welcomed. On the other hand, the sudden multiplication of new voices which globalisation affords can be judged a threat to traditional practices. The plethora of possibilities is such that bewilderment and uncertainty undermine creative confidence. Now, it can be argued, here, that the ability of globalisation to disrupt and fragment creative practices is much over estimated. Philosophical hermeneutics suggests a reason why this should be so.

To speak of new departures or new voices within a practice is to make a historical judgement. It is to note that the tradition has changed or is changing. As a result of new emergences, it is not what it was before. This suggests that a process of review and assimilation has taken place so that the tradition can no longer be thought of as it was previously. This endorses the view that a practice is not by any means an identity but a continuity of conflicts which has been decisively mediated by an engagement with the different and the other. The new cannot, therefore, be thought of as something in its own right, as something alien or utterly unique but as a change of condition or direction within a practice. Thus, the new denotes the continuity of change and tension within a tradition. The implications of this argument are as follows.

If the new is a mode of relation, if the new is an interpretative consequence of encounters between different practices, then a distinction can be drawn between the novel, exotic and ephemeral and the transformatively new on the other. This suggests a distinction comparable Gadamer’s differentiation between (1) momentary aesthetic sensationalism and (2) the continuities of aesthetically apprehended meaning. To think that the experience of the new is equivalent to the immediacy of the ›instantaneous flash of genius‹ is to treat the new as a passing distraction or diversion. If the new is conceived in this sensationalist fashion it does indeed possess the power of fragmentation. If the new becomes no more than a

\(^{10}\) Adorno, Ästhetische Theorie, p. 55.
multiplicity of individual experiences, the new is utterly fragmentary and annihilates the continuity of aesthetic experience. We become absorbed in the presence of momentary aesthetic impressions. However, such decadent self-absorption distracts us from and lacks any point of engagement with our indigenous practices. Understood in this way, the ›new‹ seems an escapist distraction. On the other hand, for substantive change to take place within a practice, there has to be genuine exchange with another. As Gadamer remarks, »alles Sichverstehen vollzieht sich aber an etwas anderem, das da verstanden wird, und schließt die Einheit und Selbigkeit dieses anderen ein.« Moments of transformative newness are momentous rather than momentary. They are a result of an engagement with another practice or tradition that has, in consequence, become decisively different to itself. Now, as we have argued, this is possible only because a practice is open to other influences because much of its own nature is unknown to itself. It requires engagement with another practice in order to acquire a sense of its inherent possibilities. A number of points follow from this.

The globalisation of music communication is not in itself a dangerous or negative phenomenon. The proliferation of other horizons is not in itself a threat. Creative traditions will only affect one another directly, if and only if there are points of mutual interest. Dialogue between practices requires not just spatial and temporal contiguity but analogous alignments of individual concern. Exchange and transformation between practices presupposes that in outlook, style, or concern each practice offers itself to the other as an opportunity for self-reflection and exploration. One practice will have an impact on another only if it contributes to issues, difficulties and debates which are part of the continuity or narrative of the influenced practice. Sometimes, a practice can be most receptive to the influence of another precisely at those vulnerable moments when its own creative resources fail. Of course, dialogue and exchange pose risks. They demand that practices in order to remain creative become different to themselves. In effect, the threat posed by globalisation to a cultural practice is no more and no less dangerous than having to face the risks and challenges which are necessarily inherent to its remaining creative. Newness per se is not the threat or problem. The ›new‹, as we have argued, is a relation, a transformative relation in which a practice becomes different to itself as a consequence of an exchange with another.

Yet do our remarks and their hermeneutic orientation marginalise the importance of the new? If one practice can transform another only at points where the internal debates or tensions within a tradition’s unfolding continuity are vulnerable or susceptible to the other, it might be said that, logically speaking, such changes were inherently possible within the tradition. As was remarked above, if perception and knowledge depend upon a background of the already-known for something to recognised as ›new‹, this is to admit that perhaps the new on a certain level, is not new at all. To acknowledge a form or a practice as ›new‹ is to say that we recognise something already known but in a new or novel guise. The ›new‹ is here grasped not in the sense of being an original emergence but as an original variation.

12 Ibid., p. 102.
of an established theme. In other words, what emerges as new must already be, in part, conceptually determinable. Where in, then, lies the shock of the new? The answer lies, in fact, in the very hermeneutic claim that appears to diminish the status of the new, namely, that for something to be recognised as ›new‹, requires that it be in part conceptually determinable.

To say that the new is in part conceptually determinable is also to say that the new is not fully conceptually determinable and that it does not fit comfortably into the schemas of the known. Without this element of conceptual indeterminacy, the new would lose its allure, its promise and, indeed, its threat. It is this element of conceptually indeterminacy within the new that needs discussion. Central to the argument has been the suggestion that any vital practice remains creative so long as it continues to question the norms that underpin it. Confronting the challenge of the new is integral to the rejuvenation of any cultural practice. This confrontation can be understood as a process of questioning and answering which is both dialogical and dialectical. To expand this suggestion, let me draw a parallel between Kant’s concept of genius and that side of the new which relates to the conceptually indeterminate.

In the Kritik der Urteilskraft, Kant argues that »eine jede Kunst setzt Regeln voraus, durch deren Grundlegung allererst ein Produkt, wenn es künstlich heißen soll, als möglich vorgestellt wird.« Thus, by analogy, every new development within a practice must conform to some known rules or expectations if it is to be recognised as ›new‹. However, Kant also argues that the art work is not produced by the imitation of rules. »Also kann die schöne Kunst sich nicht selbst die Regel ausdenken, nach der sie ihre Produkte zu Stande bringen soll.« »Genie ist das Talent (Natürgeb), welches der Kunst die Regel gibt«, for genius produces that which though rule like no rule can be given. To pursue the analogy, the new in order to be new must in part possess features that are not reducible to the known and the familiar. If as Kant argues, genius and the spirit of imitation are completely opposed, it follows that newness must in part challenge, question, be an affront to or resist what is known. In this respect, Adorno is right to comment that »die Abstraktheit des Neuen ist notwendig, man kennt es so wenig wie das furchtbarste Geheimnis von Poes Grube.« The new must therefore involve a degree of conceptual indeterminacy. As we argued, the new is essentially to be grasped as a relation. Thus, the emergence of the new in relation to an established practice represents an emergency. The norms and the expectancies of the challenged practice are thrown into disarray. However, it is precisely, the creation of an emergency and the need to respond to it that is the point. Newness is not a sudden rudeness, an affront or terrorist gesture for these only serve to strengthen the assumptions of a tradition. The challenge of the partial conceptual indeterminacy which constitutes the
new is precisely that it creates an aesthetic ›distanciation‹ that allows a deliberate and detached reflection of a dominant practice through the perspective of the new and an equally detached exploration of the new in terms of the established practice. What I mean by aesthetic ›distanciation‹ is in part related to Gadamer’s account of the negativity of experience. »Jede Erfahrung, die diesen Namen verdient«, he argues, »durchkreuzt eine Erwartung.«

In der Tat ist [...] Erfahrung zunächst immer Erfahrung der Nichtigkeit. Es ist nicht so, wie wir annehmen. Angesichts der Erfahrung, die man an einem anderen Gegenstand macht, ändert sich beides, unser Wissen und sein Gegenstand. Man weiß es anders und besser [...]. Der neue Gegenstand enthält die Wahrheit über den alten.19

The new reveals a latent possibility within an established practice that had not been seen before. We gain a better knowledge of what we thought we knew before but evidently did not. This implies an aesthetic distanciation. The new entails a dual element of conceptual determinacy – i.e. it is recognisable as making a claim about or is addressing a known practice and set of expectancies. However, the new also contains an element of conceptual indeterminacy – i.e. we know it has something to do with a given practice but we are unsure what. Hence, though exciting, the new is also unnerving, problematic, disconcerting. In other words, the experience of the new necessarily sets us at a distance from what we are familiar with, to see it from another perspective and perhaps to see in it, what we did not see or hear before. The new creates an aesthetic detachment that allows us to see in our familiar perspective what we had not seen before. It renders us strange to ourselves and opens us towards the previously withheld potentialities within our practice. Aesthetic distanciation affords a dialogical engagement with the traditional and the new. Both interrogate each other. Whether the new is genuinely new – whether it has something to say – depends upon whether over time it allows us to know more of a practice than we are presently familiar. Equally, what is of genuine worth within a practice – what is capable of responding to change and transforming itself – will be found out by the new. Either way, as with music itself, only time will tell.

In summary, the unresolved tensions within a tradition or practice, give it a dynamic which pushes it towards or make it susceptible to the new. In this respect, Adorno aptly remarks: »Seine Zuflucht hat das Alte allein an der Spitze des Neuen.«20 The new challenges the old but not in the simple sense of being opposed to it. The confrontation between the old and the new is needed by the old precisely in order to actualise the realised possibilities within itself.21 Nietzsche once remarked that we cannot understand an entity that does not have a history. A practice that had no internal conflicts or challenges would be a practice without history. It would endlessly repeat itself. What gives a practice or tradition

19 Ibid., p. 360.
21 Ibid., p. 40.
its history (or, indeed, its histories) is precisely its encounters with the strange, the foreign and the new. In other words, the continuity of a practice (the history of its transformations) is provided by the negating power of the new and not by the repetition of the old. Thus, the differential of the new is the proper location of productivity\(^2\) for it is the new which prompts a practice to realise the latent possibilities within itself.

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_Dörte Schmidt (Stuttgart)_

**Mnemosyne. Funktionen der Erinnerung in der Musik nach 1950**

_Bemerkungen zu Henri Pousseur, Helmut Lachenmann und Hans Zender_

Die Brisanz der Debatte über ›Erinnerung‹, die die Geisteswissenschaften seit geraumer Zeit beschäftigt, hängt eng zusammen mit der Frage, wie wir es in Zeiten der Kulturwissenschaften (denen wir die Debatte über kulturelle Identitäten verdanken) mit der Geschichte halten. Die Musikwissenschaft hat das Phänomen der ›Erinnerung‹ allerdings noch kaum thematisiert\(^1\) – und das, obwohl die Komponisten schon länger darüber nachdenken und auch schreiben. Der Diskussion über ›Tradition versus Geschichte‹, die uns der Titel dieses Roundtables als Aufgabe stellt, eine über die ›Erinnerung‹ hinzuzufügen und damit die darin liegende Polarisierung in ein neues Licht zu rücken, ist das Anliegen der folgenden Bemerkungen.

Beginnen möchte ich mit Bemerkungen Henri Pousseurs über sein Mnemosyne-Projekt, nicht nur, weil er den Roundtable eröffnet hat und sich so zwanglos ein thematischer Bogen schlagen lässt, sondern auch weil hier der Rahmen ausgeschritten wird, den ich mir gesteckt habe:

Seit Beginn der sechziger Jahre (anders gesagt: seit dem Augenblick, wo ich mich in den – in meinen Augen damals noch ziemlich riskanten – Versuch gestürzt hatte, das hinter mir zu lassen, was ich die ›beschränkte Serialität‹ genannt habe, ohne jedoch in eine rein retrospektive Haltung zu verfallen, in die Aufgabe oder gar den Verrat dessen, was das Serielle – und vor allem Webern – uns an äußerst Wertvollem gegeben hat), hatte der Traum in meinem Geist Gestalt angenommen, eine groß dimensionierte Komposition zu entwerfen – möglicherweise eine Art von komplexer Kan-

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\(^2\) _Ibid., p. 405_.

\(^1\) Als ersten größeren Anstoß zur Diskussion kann die im November 2001 in Paris veranstaltete Tagung »Musique et mémoire« gelten [Kongressbericht: _Musique et mémoire (= Collection Arts 8), Paris 2003_].